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An Attitude of Polish Society Towards Russian Bureaucracy in the Kingdom of Poland after the January Uprising

Stosunek społeczeństwa polskiego do biurokracji rosyjskiej w Królestwie Polskim po powstaniu styczniowym

ABSTRACT

The beginning of the era after the January Uprising brought a fundamental change in the organisation and functioning of the apparatus of civil administration in the Kingdom of Poland. In the intention of the tsarist authorities, it was supposed to be similar to the Russian model of territorial administration. All the central authorities of the Kingdom were subject to liquidation and the various areas of administrative management were subordinated to the competent ministries in St. Petersburg. The field administration has been reorganised according to Russian models. At the same time, the Russian language and officials brought from Russia were introduced to the offices. According to the tsarist authorities, only officials of Russian origin, loyal to the State, were able to effectively implement a new form of administrative system in the Kingdom and give the offices a style of functioning adopted in the administration of the Russian Empire. It was also expected that the massive influx of Russian officials with families would strengthen the number of the Russian element in the Kingdom and significantly contribute to making the country similar to the Empire's core provinces. From the Polish perspective, the Russian system of civil administration introduced in the Kingdom of Poland after the January Uprising was clearly judged by Polish society at the time to be alien to Polish tradition, imposed by force and contrary to the Polish national interest.

Keywords: administration; bureaucracy; Kingdom of Poland; Russian Empire

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The beginning of the era after the January Uprising brought a fundamental change in the organisation and functioning of the apparatus of civil administration in the Kingdom of Poland. In the intention of the tsarist authorities, it was supposed to be similar to the Russian model of territorial administration. All the central authorities of the Kingdom were subject to liquidation and the various areas of administrative governance were subordinated to the competent ministries in St. Petersburg. The field administration was reorganised according to Russian models. At the same time, the Russian language and officials brought from Russia were introduced to the offices. The change in the system and forms of action of the administration was supposed, in the opinion of Russian politicians, to effectively hold off the independence aspirations of the Polish people and to make the lands of the Kingdom of Poland one of the regular provinces of the Russian Empire.¹

The Russian unification plans drawn up by the tsarist authorities in the mid-1860s were based on the assumption that the reorganisation of the apparatus of civil administration in the Kingdom would entail a simultaneous exchange of all local clerical staff. It was then decided that the Poles would be quickly and consistently removed from their existing official posts, and they would be replaced by Russian officials, brought from the internal governorates of the Empire. The reasons why such restrictive plans were adopted against the corps of civil servants in the Kingdom of Poland, hitherto dominated by Poles, were of purely political and repressive nature.² According to the tsarist authorities, only officials of Russian origin, loyal to the State, were able to effectively implement a new form of administrative system in the Kingdom and give the offices a style of functioning adopted in the administration of the Empire. It was also expected that the massive influx of Russian officials with families would strengthen the number of the Russian

¹ A. Korobowicz, W. Witkowski, *Ustrój i prawo na ziemiach polskich. Od rozbiorów do odzyskania niepodległości*, Lublin 1994, p. 79; S. Kutrzeba, *Historia ustroju Polski w zarysie*, vol. 3, part 1, Lwów 1920, pp. 139–142; B. Winiarski, *Ustrój polityczny ziem polskich w XIX w.*, Poznań 1923, pp. 135–139. The strive of the tsarist authorities towards elimination of the administrative separateness of the Kingdom of Poland was closely related to the unification processes taking place within the Russian Empire. They also included the provinces which, like the Grand Duchy of Finland, did not show strive towards independence or even separatist tendencies. See B. Szordykowska, *Rola języka rosyjskiego w planach unifikacji Finlandii z Rosją na przełomie XIX i XX w.*, „Przegląd Humanistyczny” 1990, no. 1, pp. 99–123; J. Kucharzewski, *Od białego do czerwonego caratu*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 386–390.

² S.S. Tatiszczew, *Imperator Aleksandr II. Jego życie i carstwowanie*, Sankt Petersburg 1903, pp. 504–506; I. Kostjuszko, *Krestianskaja rieforma 1864 goda w Carstwie Polskom*, Moskwa 1962, pp. 88–90; N. Rejnke, *Oczerk zakonodatelstwa Carstwa Polskago (1807–1881)*, Sankt Petersburg 1902, pp. 113–114; S. Krzemiński, *Dwadzieścia pięć lat Rosji w Polsce (1863–1888)*, Lwów 1892, pp. 122–124; C. Ohryzko-Włodarska, *Organizacja władz włościańskich w Królestwie Polskim i ich pozostałość aktowa*, Warszawa 1973, pp. 7–8; K. Groniowski, *Realizacja reformy uwłaszczeniowej 1864 r.*, Warszawa 1963, p. 20.

element in the Kingdom and significantly contribute to making the country similar to the Empire's core provinces.³

The Russian system of civil administration introduced in the Kingdom of Poland after the January Uprising was clearly judged by Polish society at the time to be alien to Polish tradition, imposed by force and contrary to the Polish national interest. Stanisław Koszutski wrote: "The essence of the Russian system is absolute power, autocracy based on brute force, violence and terror. On the arbitrariness of bureaucracy, keeping the nation in slavery, on relentless tracking, provoking and the wiping out, with merciless cruelty, of all manifestations of actual or alleged 'dissidence'."⁴

This negative opinion also extended to the corps of civil servants, whose officials, regardless of their nationality, were perceived as ruthless executors of the Russification policy of the tsarist authorities towards the Kingdom of Poland. It used to be written at that time with some exaggeration that "all these officials are not ordinary executors of the law, but executive agents and propagators of the eradication of the Polish language, Polish civilisation and Polish national religion – Catholicism".⁵ These civil servants were also seen as incompetent in the performance of their duties. Antoni Zaleski, an insightful observer of the political life in the Kingdom at the time, characterised the staffing policy of the tsarist authorities in the post-uprising administration of the Kingdom:

As always in Russia, political and religious objectives, the frenzy of unification, put aside all the considerations of good administration, justice, order and economic growth. Often, people who were appointed to important positions were completely inadequate, they had no idea of the conditions and needs of good civil administration, [...] these were sectarians, blind and fanatical executors of the current policy [i.e. the Russification policy – G.S.].⁶

Furthermore, civil servants were negatively assessed not only because of the content of their decisions in line with the intentions of the tsarist authorities, but also, or even primarily, because of the way they treated applicants and the style of work in offices.

Customs and practices in the offices are modelled according to Russian fashion, cultivating the pride, arrogance, brutalisation, especially of weaker and dependent people, instead of delicacy and

³ K. Groniowski, *Walka Milutina z Bergiem. Spór o reorganizację Królestwa Polskiego po roku 1863*, „Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1962, no. 4, p. 896; N. Rejnke, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–113; J.K. Targowski, *Komitet Urządzający i jego ludzie*, „Przegląd Historyczny” 1937, vol. 14(1), p. 1; P. Wandycz, *Pod zaborami*, Warszawa 1994, pp. 252–253; B. Winiarski, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–136; C. Ohryzko-Włodarska, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴ S. Koszutski, *Co nam Rosja dała i co nam wzięła?*, Warszawa 1917, p. 4.

⁵ A. Tyszkiewicz (Hrabia Leliwa), *Zarys stosunków polsko-rosyjskich*, Kraków 1895, p. 174.

⁶ A. Zaleski, *Towarzystwo warszawskie*, Warszawa 1971, p. 444.

courtesy in relations. Applicants in offices are treated with supremacy, disrespectfully, their time is not respected, and their dependence on the authority is communicated to them at every stage.⁷

This statement concerned both Russian and Polish officials, as the latter often took over the style of proceeding from their Russian superiors.

Not by any aversion or prejudice, but as a result of conscious reflection and everyday experience, everyone, even a foreigner, must conclude and state that the Russian clerical, judicial or teaching staff starts to be a decaying and demoralising factor in relation to and in contact with Polish society.⁸

A noticeable novelty in the relations between applicants and officials, which appeared with the influx of a large number of Russians in the Kingdom of Poland after the January Uprising, was bribery to the extent unknown here before. This was the most characteristic feature of Russian officials. Bribery had flourished in Russia since the end of the 18th century and extended to the areas annexed to it in the 19th century. Russian officials plundered the conquered nations, including the population of the Kingdom of Poland, and after several years of work they used to go back home enriched, where they usually lived a prosperous life. And this reprehensible behaviour of the Russians was often followed by officials of Polish origin. Society very quickly adapted to the new way of functioning of the offices. Offering a “kuban” (i.e a bribe) to an official, even not for processing the case but simply for initiating it, was treated as an evil, but a necessary evil. An unofficial “bribery price list” soon appeared, for example a “fee” for permit to cross the border was 3 roubles, for the issue of a passport – 10 roubles, but exemption from military service was from 1,500 to 3,000 roubles.⁹ According to Aleksander Kraushar’s experience “many scoundrels who only understood the language of bribery used to be encountered in the offices”.¹⁰

Within the entire corps of officials, the most critical, and usually even hostile, attitude of Polish society was towards officials of Russian origin, which is understandable for both political and psychological reasons. “There is a Russian colony in Warsaw, but Russian officials enjoy a poor reputation here, as well as anywhere else. More decent Russians do not assume official positions in Poland, as they do not want to perform functions so hated by Poles”.¹¹ The governorates of the Kingdom of Poland did not have the best reputation as places of service for an honest Russian. Those who, for some reasons (mainly poor qualifications),

⁷ S. Koszutski, *op. cit.*, pp. 22–23.

⁸ A. Zaleski, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

⁹ A. Chwalba, *Imperium korupcji w Rosji i Królestwie Polskim w latach 1861–1917*, Kraków 1995, p. 57.

¹⁰ A. Kraushar, *Czasy sądownictwa rosyjskiego w Warszawie (1876–1915)*, Warszawa 1916, pp. 27–28.

¹¹ G. Brandes, *Polska*, Lwów 1902, p. 81.

could not find a job in Russia, were delegated to exile, i.e. holding an office in “the Vistula Land”. Usually, the Russian clerical staff, especially the lower-rank, left a lot to be desired, both in terms of the level of education, moral qualities, tact and diligence in performing official duties. In 1895, Józef Piłsudski wrote in the Polish Socialist Party’s newspaper “Robotnik”: “A judge does not need to know the law, an engineer – mechanics, a teacher – pedagogy; it is enough to be a Russian to have everything at one’s disposal, including public funds”.¹² The image of Russian officials was outlined by A. Zaleski:

In moments of hectic and excited life, a Russian (of course I am not talking about exceptions, but about an average individual) is intemperate and passionate in his caprices and desires, ruthless and wild in manners. He does not take into account the law, social order and the simplest requirements of normal progress. Inflated with boundless, tribal and national pride, he disregards any general idea of justice and humanity. The national sense and strive towards political, though undefined, transformation, that emerged during the period of Alexander II’s reforms, confronted the untimely Polish movements of 1863 and discharged on our country all its brutal national energy and revolutionary-social aspirations. Over time, this legion of original deyatels (activists) was replaced by common Asians without any morals and principles, who exploit people for mere economical gain, and continue the work of the initial advocates of the idea of Russification and state social-revolutionary unity. And here I must repeat to you again what I mentioned briefly in my previous letters, that the most national product of Russian civilization and industry is *chinovnik*. Despite immense areas, larger than many parts of the world, despite the enormous agricultural and industrial resources that have so far been lying fallow, Russia is able to experience hunger and give out its domestic industry into German and foreign hands, but one native thing will never be lacking: the *chinovnik*. They are constantly swarming, the demise and ruin of noble estates make them even more numerous. They have an imperative to find something to change and transform, they must track and sniff imaginary plots, religious and national oppositions, they must constantly strive to attract attention in this way, maintain their position and win promotion. For them, it is no longer a matter of principle, but a matter of bread and existence. Like locusts, they also swarmed the Kingdom and the conquered countries, and they displaced, under the political pretexts, quiet, peaceful and distinguished Poles, from offices, the judiciary, schools and railways, and from higher military ranks. Thus, they created in Poland a group of proletariat within the intelligentsia, constantly increased by young people who cannot find a job anywhere. Each such *chinovnik* must create the pretexts of some national nobility-and-Catholic agitation and invent various ways of show himself before the government in the service of Orthodoxy and Russification. And as a result, in a country with millions of bayonets and numerous Muscovite officials, where a Pole cannot move and breathe anywhere, where they confiscate his property, where they deprive him of the right to buy, lease and pledge, the press and officials keep yelling that the Poles suppress the Russians, and that Catholicism suppresses the Orthodox Christianity. Towards a Pole, each such *chinovnik* is an autocratic satrap; almost everyone, always with noble exceptions, while being paid a salary higher than that of officials in the empire, draws everything that can be shaken down also from pockets of the local population and from all public works.¹³

¹² J. Piłsudski, *Rusyfikacja*, [in:] *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1937, p. 97.

¹³ A. Zaleski, *op. cit.*, pp. 442–443.

Such a pejorative image of the Russians also resulted from their particularly privileged position in the Kingdom. They were a group completely separate from the local population, in a much better financial situation than most Poles.

Russians did well in Warsaw, especially those high-rank officials who completely dominated higher administrative posts. They occupied almost all the fancy apartments located on principal streets, on the first floors, in houses where on the third or fourth floor modest residents, the natives, lived. The newcomers imported food for themselves from Russia proper. They didn't even buy the flour, because only *krupczatka* [coarse ground flour] satisfied their sublime taste. The stores of Russian goods provided them with all kinds of delicatessen, caviars of various colours and sweet Filippov's bread. They even imported matches from Russia, not to mention tobacco products, which were imported exclusively from the renowned factories of the Empire. Polish stores did not enjoy Russian clientele. [...] Over time, special districts of a purely Russian nature were created in Warsaw. For example, Aleje Ujazdowskie and Łazienki have lost their once purely Polish character. One can find there only Russian families, nannies in kokoshniks and gaudy robes leading Russian children dressed in Circassian costumes. The language heard there was mostly Russian [...]. On the trams, in silence kept by native passengers, Russian officials held loud conversations in their own language. The pavements were crowded by chinovniks in hats with a wide, stiff brim, decorated with an emblem of proper corps in which they served, a badge on the lampasse and a mandatory cane in hand.¹⁴

By their very nature, most ostracised by Polish society were officials holding the highest and, consequently, the most exposed official positions. In the administration of the Kingdom of Poland, after the January Uprising, these included Governor-General of Warsaw and ten positions of governors in charge of individual governors of the Kingdom. According to the guidelines of Russification policy of the tsarist authorities, these positions were occupied by officials of Russian origin. Once the office of Viceroy was liquidated in January 1874, the highest administrative authority in the Kingdom of Poland became the office of Governor-General of Warsaw (Varshavskiy General-Gubernator).¹⁵ According to the provisions of the All-Russian Provincial Law, the Governor-General was "the highest representative of the government in the part of the state covered by his jurisdiction".¹⁶ He served both as the head of the civil administration and military commander, hence in the Kingdom of Poland the Governor-General had also the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Military District (Komanduyushchiy Voyskami Varshavskogo Voennogo Okruga).¹⁷ In accordance with the provisions of the Ukase (Imperial Decree)

¹⁴ A. Kraushar, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–43.

¹⁵ S. Askenazy, *Sto lat zarządu w Królestwie Polskim (1800–1900)*, Lwów 1901, p. 56; S. Kutrzeba, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–143; K. Grzybowski, *Historia państwa i prawa Polski*, vol. 4: *Od uwłaszczenia do odrodzenia Państwa*, Warszawa 1982, p. 72; A. Korobowicz, W. Witkowski, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

¹⁶ Zbiór Praw 1876, vol. 2, part I, p. 232, Article 416; K. Grzybowski, *op. cit.*, p. 72; E. Amburger, *Geschichte der Behordenorganisation Russlands von Peter dem Grossen bis 1917*, Leiden 1966, pp. 369–379.

¹⁷ Under the Ukase of 25 March / 7 April 1875 the Suwałki Governorate was incorporated into the Vilnius Military District, and the Brześć fortress was subordinated to the Warsaw District. See

of 29 February / 12 March 1868 that remained in force, the Governor-General was the “supreme guardian of public order”, obliged to “ensure the strict implementation of the laws and regulations of the government”. The Governor-General of Warsaw was granted extensive police powers. He had the right to independently issue secondary-law regulations “in order to prevent law abuses or to ensure security and civil order”, to impose administrative penalties and even to declare martial law.¹⁸ Such significant attributes of administrative and police-military power of the Governor-General of Warsaw distinguished him from similar offices in the Empire. In fact, the Governor-General of Warsaw was a political body with a high degree of autonomy, which in the intention of the tsarist authorities was to supervise and coordinate the Russification activities of his subordinate offices. The methods of implementing this policy, which lasted in the Kingdom of Poland with varying degrees of intensity until the outbreak of World War I, depended to a large extent on those who held this position.

The first Governor-General of Warsaw was General Count Pavel Evstafievich Kotzebue, appointed 11 / 23 January 1974.¹⁹ The six-year period of his term in Warsaw was a continuation of the Russification and unification policy in the Kingdom of Poland, which began during the term of office of Viceroy F.F. Berg (1863–1874). Kotzebue was the executor of the liquidation of the Greek-Catholic Diocese of Chełm, decided in 1875, and of the forced imposition of the Orthodox Church on the followers of that rite. The resistance of the Uniates and parts of the parish clergy in Podlasie was then suppressed by brutal administrative and police methods, not hesitating to use pacification units of Cossacks. In 1876, he oversaw the introduction of the organisation of judiciary in the Kingdom modelled on the Russian model of judicial organisation and Russian judicial laws.²⁰ Diarists of that time assessed General Kotzebue negatively, seeing him as a continuator of the policy of repression against the society of the Kingdom of Poland. They agreed, however, that throughout his time in office he had tried to comply with the laws in force, and had severely eliminated the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy under his

A. Okolski, *Wykład prawa administracyjnego i prawa administracyjnego obowiązującego w Królestwie Polskim*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1880, p. 68; K. Grzybowski, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹⁸ Dziennik Praw (DPKP), vol. 68, p. 23; S. Kutrzeba, *op. cit.*, p. 14; K. Grzybowski, *op. cit.*, p. 72; N.N., *Administracja rosyjska w Królestwie Polskim*, Wiedeń 1915, pp. 9–11.

¹⁹ *Russkij Biograficzeskij Słownik*, vol. 9, Sankt Petersburg 1903, pp. 358–361; S. Krzemiński, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–163; I. Ihnatowicz, *Vademecum do badań nad historią XIX i XX wieku*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1971, p. 170; A. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

²⁰ J. Lewandowski, *Likwidacja obrządku greckokatolickiego w Królestwie Polskim w latach 1874–1875*, „Annales UMCS. Sectio F” 1960, vol. 21, pp. 220–223; A. Korobowicz, *Stosunek władz świeckich do obrządku greckokatolickiego w świetle prawa Królestwa Polskiego (1815–1875)*, „Annales UMCS. Sectio F” 1965, vol. 20(9), pp. 145–158; idem, *Reforma ustroju sądownictwa w Królestwie Polskim po 1863 r. Przygotowania i treść*, Lublin 1976, pp. 94–98; idem, *Sądownictwo Królestwa Polskiego 1876–1915*, Lublin 1995, pp. 71–83.

control. He was seen more as a German-Evangelical Christian in Russian service, obediently and strictly following the orders of his superiors, than as the initiator of further repressions against the Kingdom of Poland.²¹ Due to the liberalisation of policy towards the Kingdom planned by Alexander II, on 18 / 30 May 1880 Kotzebue was dismissed from his post and retired.²²

Tsar Alexander II replaced dismissed General Kotzebue with General Pyotr Pavlovich Albedinski as Warsaw Governor-General.²³ The appointment of Albedinski was related to the change in policy towards the Kingdom planned by Alexander II's milieu and the assumption of the office of Minister of the Interior by Count Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov, a liberal. This is how Stanisław Krzemiński expressed the hopes prevailing at the time in the Kingdom regarding Albedinski:

He came to Warsaw with the reputation of a gentle man, and during his rule in the Kingdom he kept up this reputation. An educated and European man, he took into account the position of Poles from a humane standpoint, and since life under his rule in Lithuania after Potapov was more free, there was no need to fear deliberate persecution in the Kingdom either.²⁴

When in office in the Kingdom, Albedinski was keen to surround himself with Poles. Representatives of the political and economic elite of the Kingdom were frequent visitors to the Royal Castle. This also influenced Albedinski's activities. In February 1881, he presented to Alexander II a memorandum in which he proposed to abandon ruthless Russification in education. He postulated to establish a chair of Polish language and literature lectured in Polish, in accordance with the Act of 1869 establishing the Imperial University of Warsaw. This intention was met with strong opposition from the superintendent of the Warsaw Educational District Apukhtin, who tried to oppose him in St. Petersburg. Ultimately, the chair of Polish literature was established, but with Russian as the language of instruction. Albedinski, on the other hand, managed to push through an increase in lessons of Polish in the Kingdom's grammar schools up to eighteen hours, but here, too, Apukhtin caused to make it a supererogatory subject.²⁵ Censorship activities were clearly mitigated, enabling Polish publicists to engage in polemics with Katkov's anti-Polish articles published in "Moskovske Vedomosti". In 1882, the tsarist government concluded a concordat negotiated for four years with the Holy See. After twenty years of exile, Archbishop of Warsaw Feliński and Bishop of Vilnius Krasiński returned to the Kingdom. Thanks to Albedinski's intercession, the concordat stipulated that the language of instruction in Catholic clerical seminars in the Kingdom would be

²¹ S. Krzemiński, *op. cit.*, pp. 168–169; A. Zaleski, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–89, 93–96.

²² *Russkij Biograficzeskij...*, p. 360.

²³ Ł. Chimiak, *Gubernatorzy rosyjscy w Królestwie Polskim 1863–1915*, Wrocław 1999, p. 311.

²⁴ S. Krzemiński, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 173–175.

Polish.²⁶ Six months after the conclusion of the Concordat, on 19 / 31 May 1883 Albedinski died in Warsaw, having suffered from a serious illness. The three-year period during which he held office as Governor-General of Warsaw brought a temporary halt to the Russification efforts of the tsarist government in St. Petersburg and Russian activists in the Kingdom. Albedinski was the only governor-general who met with relative fondness from the people of the Kingdom of Poland.²⁷

After the death of General Albedinski, General Josif Vadimirovich Hurko was appointed as the third Governor-General of Warsaw.²⁸ His rule in the Kingdom coincided with the reign of Alexander III (1881–1894). The new Russian monarch halted all reforms of his father to transform Russia into a modern bourgeois state and sharply returned to the rule of reaction. The former associates of Alexander II – the Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Mikhail T. Loris-Melikov, the Minister of War, Count Dmitri Milutin, and the Minister of Finance, Alexander A. Abazy, were ousted from power. A decisive influence on Alexander III and his decisions in internal politics was taken over by the supporters of unlimited absolute monarchy: Konstantin Pobedonostsev, the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod since 1882, Minister of Internal Affairs, Count Mikhail Tolstoy, Minister of Education Ivan P. Deljanov, and General Sergei Stroganov, former tutor of the new Tsar. Alexander III announced the rules of his reign in the manifesto of 29 April / 11 May 1881 on the inviolability of autocracy. He assumed therein that the best and only form of government in Russia was an autocratic monarchy supported by the Orthodox Church. In domestic politics, the Tsar's manifesto meant the intensification of the Russification oppression of all national and religious minorities, for the sake of Great Russian nationalism. This was particularly felt by the societies of the Kingdom of Poland or the Baltic states, and even of Finland having wide autonomy so far. An ardent supporter and propagator of the idea of *obrussienye* (Russification) of nations ruled by the Romanov dynasty was Michail Katkov, who was still an editor of "Moskovske Vedomosti".²⁹

This policy had been implemented in the Kingdom of Poland since 1883 for eleven years by General Hurko, assisted by the superintendent of the Warsaw Education District, Apukhtin. An insightful observer of the political life of Warsaw at that time, Antoni Zaleski, described General Albedinski's successor in the position of Governor-General of Warsaw as follows:

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 176.

²⁷ *Encyklopedia Powszechna Ultima Thule*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1927, p. 97; S. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, p. 58; A. Zaleski, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

²⁸ L. Chimiak, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

²⁹ L. Bazyłow, *Historia Rosji*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1985, pp. 385–391; W. Serczyk, *Poczet władców Rosji (Romanowowie)*, Londyn 1992, pp. 214–221; W.G. Czernucha, *Aleksander III, [in:] Dynastia Romanowów*, Warszawa 1993, pp. 375–379.

As a soldier-harsh, strict, rigorous, he seems to be a martinet, an obedient emperor's tool, and not a man of a coterie or party. But in fact, he is a full-blooded deyatel [activist] who does not limit himself to executing orders, but asks for them himself, takes the initiative himself.³⁰

Throughout his term of office in Warsaw, Hurko strived for the full and ruthless Russification of the Kingdom, often resorting to brutal police methods. On his initiative, Russian was imposed as an official language on private railways and banks. Poles were expelled from the public administration and the judiciary on a larger scale than before, and were replaced with officials brought from the core governorates of the Empire. With Hurko's acquiescence, the arbitrariness of the offices increased, including primarily the police and gendarmerie. The persecution of Uniates intensified. Secret teaching of the Polish language was subject to extensive repression. The slogans of "organic work" were at that time welcomed by the depressed Polish society. At the same time, secret socialist organizations were established and developed. They were persecuted with ruthless severity, e.g. in the case of the "Proletaryat" in 1884, the court of war sentenced several accused to death and several dozen to exile. In Hurko's time, the prison and the 10th pavilion of the Warsaw Citadel were constantly overcrowded with political prisoners. The methods used by Hurko and Apukhtin in the Kingdom faced wide condemnation, both in Europe and in Russia itself. Despite this, Hurko retained his office until the very death of Alexander III. The new Russian Emperor, Nicholas II, on 6 / 18 December 1894 called off Hurka from the Kingdom, and two years later also Apukhtin, deluding Polish society with a "new era" in Russian policy towards national minorities living in the provinces of the Empire.³¹

Under the Ukase of 13 / 25 December 1894, Tsar Nicholas I appointed Pavel Andreevich Shuvalov another Governor-General of Warsaw.³² Shuvalov's appointment was received in the Kingdom as a forerunner of stopping the ruthless Russification efforts of Hurko administration. These hopes were sustained by the placatory tone of the ukase on the appointment of the new Governor-General. Shuvalov enjoyed in the Kingdom the reputation of a liberal, a "European", supporter of political reforms in Russia and a close alliance with France and England. However, after nearly thirty years of unification efforts in the Kingdom, the Russification process was already so advanced that the short, less than two years, Shuvalov's term in Warsaw, did not bring about significant changes, apart from easing censorship. Shuvalov himself

³⁰ A. Zaleski, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–141.

³¹ A. Tuszyńska, *Rosjanie w Warszawie*, Warszawa 1992, pp. 67–68; I. Ichnatowicz, *Spółeczeństwo polskie w latach 1864–1914*, [in:] *Dzieje narodu i państwa polskiego*, Warszawa 1988, pp. 31–36, 46–52; P. Wandycz, *op. cit.*, pp. 292–300; S. Krzemiński, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–255; J. Buszko, *Historia Polski 1864–1948*, Warszawa 1984, pp. 72–74.

³² Ł. Chimiak, *op. cit.*, p. 326; *Encyklopedia Powszechna Ultima Thule*, vol. 10, part 6, Warszawa 1939, p. 356; S. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63; I. Ichnatowicz, *Vademecum...*, p. 170.

did not take any initiative to change relations in the Kingdom after Hurko's rule. Suffering a severe illness, he limited his activities to the day-to-day supervision of his administration, and even in this he was replaced, since mid-1896, by his assistant for civil affairs Alexandr I. Petrov. Due to the still deteriorating health condition, at the end of 1896 Shuvalov requested the Emperor for a dismissal. He received it on 12 / 24 December 1896.³³

After the resignation of Count Shuvalov, the fifth Governor-General of Warsaw was appointed on 1 / 13 January 1897 in the person of General Duke Alexandr Konstantinovich Imeretinsky.³⁴ Imeretinsky's appointment raised hopes in the Kingdom concerning limited concessions by the tsarist authorities in their policy towards the Kingdom. Nicholas II allowed the erection of the monument of Adam Mickiewicz in Warsaw on the centenary of the poet's birth, and he assigned one million roubles donated to him by the society of the Kingdom for the establishment of a polytechnic university, but with Russian as the language of instruction. The Kingdom's industry grew rapidly and exports and trade with Russia continued to grow. In these circumstances, on the initiative of Zygmunt Wielopolski and with the support of the aristocracy and plutocracy of the Kingdom, a faction advocating the coming to terms with Russian rule was formed, the so-called "realists". In the spirit of reconciliation between the two nations, articles by Erazm Piltz appeared in the newspapers "Kraj", "Słowo" and "Kurier Polski". Supporters of the settlement with Russia hoped that the young Russian monarch would go back to Alexander II's political reforms in Russia and the abandoned constitutional plans of the Loris-Melikov era. This could bring national freedoms to Polish society, and perhaps autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland within the Romanov Empire. These hopes quickly turned out to be futile. Under pressure from close associates, the Tsar abandoned his reform plans and the Russification continued in the Kingdom. Imeretinsky himself, under the guise of favouring the Polish cause, drew up a secret memorandum for Nicholas II, in which not only he discouraged the Emperor from any political concessions in the Kingdom and warned him about the tendency of Poles to rebel, but even urged the Tsar to intensify the unification work. After three years in office in the Kingdom, Imeretinsky died in Warsaw on 18 / 30 November 1900.³⁵

³³ W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski. Okres 1864–1914*, Gdańsk 1991, pp. 18, 278–280; S. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63; I. Ihnatowicz, *Vademecum...*, p. 170.

³⁴ Ł. Chimiak, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–317; *Encyklopedia Powszechna Ultima Thule*, vol. 4, Warszawa 1930, p. 720; I. Ihnatowicz, *Vademecum...*, p. 170; S. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–64.

³⁵ K. Groniowski, J. Skowronek, *Historia Polski 1795–1914*, Warszawa 1987, pp. 260–261; W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 276–286. The memorandum of Duke Imeretinsky was acquired by chance by the Petersburg unit of the Polish Socialist Party and then made public in 1899 in London. The introduction to this publication was prepared by Józef Piłsudski who presented the entire

Another Governor-General of Warsaw, appointed by Tsar Nicholas II on 25 March / 6 April 1901, was General Michail Ivanovich Chertkov.³⁶ Chertkov was a supporter of the continuation of hard-line Russification towards the society of the Kingdom of Poland. He sought to impose Russian as the official language in Towarzystwo Kredytowe Ziemskie (a land-owners' credit union), and in 1902 introduced a mandatory Russian language exam for seminarians. However, he was unable to effectively counter the rising wave of discontent with the tsarist government after Russia lost the war with Japan and the first outburst of proletariat unrest in the Kingdom. When notified of the outbreak of the revolution in Russia and the Kingdom of Poland, the old and ailing Chertkov was only able to respond with the announcement on 16 / 29 January 1905 of the state of enhanced protection. For lack of more decided action, he was dismissed on 20 February / 4 March 1905. Then he went to Russia, where he soon died.³⁷

Concurrently with the dismissal of General Chertkov, his successor in the Polish Kingdom was appointed, namely General Konstantin Klavdewich Maximovich.³⁸ It was not a random appointment. In the opinion of the tsarist authorities, the spreading workers' unrest posed a risk of the outbreak of another uprising. They were confirmed in this belief by the fact that the demonstrators in the Kingdom, in addition to social demands, increasingly demanded the restoration of national freedoms. Chertkov's successor, a long-time Ataman of the Don Cossacks (1889–1905), was expected by St. Petersburg to pursue decisive pacification. The new Governor-General of Warsaw, however, could not successfully accomplish the mission entrusted to him. After the failed attempted assassination that took place on Miodowa street on 6 / 19 May 1905, carried out by the Combat Organization of the Polish Socialist Party, intimidated Maximovich took refuge in the military camp in Zegrze. He did not leave this place until the end of his term, losing control of developments in the Kingdom. In this situation, under the Ukase of 15 / 28 August 1905, Tsar Nicholas II dismissed him from Warsaw, and entrusted the civil and military authority in the Kingdom of Poland to General Georgy Antonovich Skalon.³⁹

Since the beginning of his term of office, Skalon became known as an efficient and ruthless riot suppressor in the Kingdom. As soon as on 8 November 1905 he telegraphically alarmed St. Petersburg:

hypocrisy of Imeretinsky's activity in the Kingdom. See J. Piłsudski, *Księżę Imeretyński o sprawie robotniczej*, [in:] *Pisma...*, pp. 218–222.

³⁶ Ł. Chimiak, *op. cit.*, p. 313; S. Askenazy, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–68; I. Ichnatowicz, *Vademecum...*, p. 170; *Encyklopedia Powszechna Ultima Thule*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1928, pp. 669–670.

³⁷ F. Tych, *Rok 1905*, [in:] *Dzieje narodu i państwa polskiego*, Warszawa 1990, pp. 24–30; *Encyklopedia...*, vol. 2, p. 670; S. Kutrzeba, *op. cit.*, pp. 175–177.

³⁸ Ł. Chimiak, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

³⁹ *Encyklopedia Powszechna Ultima Thule*, vol. 7, Warszawa 1937, pp. 263–264; F. Tych, *op. cit.*, p. 31; W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 510–511.

The revolutionary movement in the country under my responsibility visibly and rapidly intensifies, overwhelms ever wider groups and penetrates even into the peasant masses. The situation is extremely serious and I see only one way out of it – an immediate declaration of martial law throughout the Kingdom of Poland. I find any delay dangerous.⁴⁰

The Tsar accepted the request of Skalon and on 28 October / 10 November 1905 ordered martial law to be declared throughout the Kingdom. In all governorates, the power was assumed by interim governors-general appointed from among military top brass. When giving them special powers of attorney, Skalon drew attention to Article 12 of the Martial Law provisions, which allowed them to impose the death penalty without a trial, provided that the Tsar was notified of this. On 29 October / 11 November 1905, he approved special instructions on “protection of the Vistula Country in case of an uprising”, and three days later recommended that the interim wartime governors-general “consider all demonstrations and gatherings as bands of rebels and shoot without trial, confiscate all illegal publications and immediately arrest their editors and publishers”. Skalon remained a supporter of such methods in the Kingdom even after the revolution was extinguished, being still more of a gendarme than the administrator of the country of his responsibility. He died in Warsaw on 1 / 14 February 1914. His less than nine years in power constituted the period of most severe repression in the Kingdom since the January Uprising.⁴¹

Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, the vacant post of Warsaw Governor-General was taken by General Yakov Grigorevich-Zhilinski.⁴² He was the shortest incumbent governor-general in the Kingdom of Poland. Less than four months after his nomination, he was dismissed on 25 September / 8 October 1914. The last Governor-General of Warsaw was General Pavel Nikolayevich Engalychev, appointed on 25 January / 7 February 1915 who held office in Warsaw for only half a year, i.e. until the evacuation of Russian authorities from the Kingdom in August 1915.⁴³ The last two governors-general of Warsaw held office too short a time to evoke deeper reflection on their activities in Polish society.

As a conclusion, it should be stated that almost all Russian officials holding the post of Governor-General of Warsaw, with few exceptions, were seen by Polish society as ruthless executors of the Russification policy towards the Kingdom of Poland, often resorting to brutal methods in breaking all manifestations of resistance of the Polish population to the unification plans of the tsarist authorities in the Kingdom.

⁴⁰ F. Tych, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 31–40; S. Kalabiński, *Carat i klasy posiadające w walce z rewolucją 1905–1907 w Królestwie Polskim*, Warszawa 1956, p. 301; W. Pobóg-Malinowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 544–546.

⁴² Ł. Chimiak, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, p. 317.

Greater or lesser involvement in the implementation in the Kingdom of Poland of the Russification policy developed in St. Petersburg was also the basic criterion for assessing by Polish society the official activities of persons holding the posts of governors who administered individual governorates of the Kingdom. During the fifty years of functioning of the Russian administrative model in the Kingdom of Poland after the January Uprising, nearly eighty people held such positions. As a rule, such functions were reserved exclusively for officials of Russian origin, which was intended by the tsarist authorities to ensure consistent Russification of the administration of the Kingdom of Poland and police and political supervision over the local population. The involvement of individual governors in the implementation of this policy, compliance with the law and concern for the needs of the Polish inhabitants of the province, or the lack thereof, were the basis for their assessment by local communities. Based on these criteria, some of them were assessed as “good” and others as “bad” governors. Following the Łukasz Chimiak’s findings, it should be stated that the category of “good” governors, who supported local social initiatives and toned down the blind Russification drives of their subordinates, included, according to Polish society, only a few, such as Governor of Kielce Aleksandr Nikitich-Leshchov (1871–1884), Governor of Radom Arkady Andreyevich-Tolchov (1883–1888) and Governor of Kalisz Mikhail Petrovich-Daragan (1883–1902).⁴⁴ Most Russian governors in the Kingdom of Poland were seen as representatives of a foreign power imposed by violence and as supporters and ruthless executors of a repressive political agenda against all manifestations of national separateness in the country pacified after the January Uprising. Extreme examples of this were: the ruthless liquidator of the Uniate rite in Podlasie – the Governor of Siedlce, Stepan Stepanowich Gromeka (1867–1875), a supporter of Russification and detachment of the Chełm region from the Kingdom of Poland – the Governor of Lublin, Vladimir Filippovich-Tkhorzhevsky (1886–1905), or those fighting against all (even architectural!) manifestations of Polishness in their governorships: Ivan Semyonovich Kakhanov – Governor of Piotrków between 1867–1884; Konstantin Dmitrevich Khlebnikov – holding the position of Governor of Kielce from 1867 to 1869.⁴⁵

Poles employed in the civil administration of the Kingdom did not enjoy a good reputation in society either, mainly because they formed part of a generally unaccepted political system. However, the public were aware of the differences in their attitudes and motives for their service on the Russian state apparatus. Antoni Zaleski described the following types of Polish officials serving in the civil administration of the Kingdom:

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 249–256.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 222–229.

[...] it is also worthy to say at least a few words about officials who are Poles. There are numerous kinds of them, and their moral value differs. There are people among them who are very decent, reasoned, and there are worse ones, cowardly, taking care of the office as the only job and source of maintenance they have, fearful and afraid of any shadow. I always take the most sincere pity on them and I understand the hardship of their situation. Such a poor man must take extraordinary caution, watch himself at every step, watch his mouth, consider every circumstance and bow down, and to humbly endure sulks, and to bend to the system imposed on him, suppress any own personal conviction, hide all his sense of dignity and nationality, to work for all Russian workmates, because these are usually extremely lazy and uneducated. And in return for all this, to experience continuous humiliation, to be overlooked in everything because of his religion and nationality, to watch as any Russian sent from St. Petersburg takes away his promotion, as his work, diligence, perseverance and even the greatest expertise will be in vain and considered next to nothing. A true Sisyphus, who still pushes his stone upwards and still sees it rolling down to his feet, far away from the top, without any hope for appreciation and improvement of situation, and worst of all, without the inner conviction that his service will bring some benefit to the country and will allow him to fulfil duties for the community, at least in a small part. They urge or tempt these individuals to convert to Orthodox Christianity all the time. There are others, careerist, who can perfectly adapt and deftly bypass any obstacles, forget about everything, just to achieve the desired goal. They would Russify themselves right at the start by the fact that together with their Orthodox colleagues they stand ready for all abuses, accept any form of bribery, they would not take care of any social consideration and the benefit of the country, renounce all the rules and follow the model of behaviour of foreign officials.

Finally, there are also the worst of them all, thank God very rare, who would even outperform the Russians in their officiousness, and they do so not out of cowardice or fear, not out of duty and in the hope of providing themselves with an easygoing job, but through love for the "craft", through some strange brain organisation, which make them the nastiest type that one can meet in Warsaw: a Russified official, plus russe que le czar. Ask anybody about them, and you'll be told that they tend to be worse than even the worst Russians, and sophisticated in persecution. It would be understandable if they did this for some selfish or material purpose. No, they feel perfectly well that all their mean deeds will do nothing, that their merits and new extermination ideas will not be rewarded by the government, that due to their Polish origin they will not be promoted to any higher post and will always have to give way before officials sent from Russia.⁴⁶

From today's point of view, it is difficult to assess unequivocally the reasons behind joining the civil service and the attitude of Poles employed in the Russian civil authorities in the Kingdom of Poland during the post-uprising period. Certainly, while working in the administration of the invader, they contributed to the Russification of the Kingdom, and some of them were zealous promoters of the new political agenda and loyal servants of the Tsar. In the vast majority, however, they were just officials performing their duties more or less conscientiously, and they treated service in the Russian administration primarily as a means of earning a livelihood. When in lower positions, they were not even aware of the direction of the anti-Polish policy of the tsarist authorities. However, the mere fact that they had held positions in the invader's administrative apparatus, so hated by all, meant that there was generally no longer any room for them in the administration of the reborn Republic.

⁴⁶ A. Zaleski, *op. cit.*, pp. 328–329.

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ABSTRAKT

Początek epoki popowstaniowej przyniósł w Królestwie Polskim zasadniczą zmianę organizacji i funkcjonowania aparatu zarządu cywilnego. W intencji władz carskich miał on upodobnić się do rosyjskiego modelu administracji terytorialnej. Likwidacji uległy wszystkie władze centralne Królestwa, a poszczególne dziedziny zarządu administracyjnego podporządkowano właściwym resortowo ministerstwom w Petersburgu. Administracja terenowa została poddana reorganizacji według wzorów rosyjskich. Do urzędów wprowadzono jednocześnie język rosyjski i sprowadzonych z Rosji urzędników. W przekonaniu władz carskich tylko urzędnicy pochodzenia rosyjskiego, lojalni wobec państwa, mogli skutecznie wprowadzić w życie nowy kształt ustroju administracyjnego w Królestwie i nadać urzędom styl funkcjonowania przyjęty w administracji Cesarstwa Rosyjskiego. Spodziewano się także, że masowy napływ urzędników rosyjskich wraz z rodzinami wzmocni liczebność żywiołu rosyjskiego w Królestwie i wydatnie przyczyni się do upodobnienia tego kraju do jednej z wewnętrznych prowincji Imperium. Wprowadzony w Królestwie Polskim po powstaniu styczniowym rosyjski ustrój organów administracji cywilnej był przez polskie społeczeństwo tamtych czasów oceniany jednoznacznie jako obcy polskiej tradycji, narzucony siłą i sprzeczny z polskim interesem narodowym.

Słowa kluczowe: administracja; biurokracja; Królestwo Polskie; Cesarstwo Rosyjskie